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ABSTRACT  
The WTO Trips agreement’s basic objective of establishing minimum 
international standards for IP rights protection is based on a  restrictive “one-
fits-all” approach that denies the right to enact or not to enact intellectual 
property rights provisions to developing countries and least developed countries 
and restrict their ability to effectively adapt national laws to their own socio-
economic environment and development level. Developed countries had widely 
benefited from this privilege when no minimum binding standards of intellectual 
property existed in multilateral relations. The Trips agreement stabilizes the 
strong inequalities in terms of bargaining power between rich and poor countries 
; it also reinforces the pressure exerted by US big business firms during the 
negotiation process to universalize the western system of IP rights to the 
detriment of indigenous communities’ intellectual property rights. In practice, 
the Trips agreement illustrates how an international agreement is to facilitate 
biopiracy by protecting rich countries’ inventions and ignoring those from the 
poor ones.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
From a global perspective the WTO Trips agreement has been analysed within 
the framework of the political economic development of a capitalist system and 
the quest of the United States (US), followed by the other developed countries, 
to preserve the monopoly of their multinational corporations on the world 
economic scene and to harmonize intellectual property (IP) rights starting from 
their own legal standards (Oddi, 1996; Aoki, 1998; Sell, 2003, McKinley, 2007).  
International flows of benefits coming from the protection of the intellectual 
property were mainly directed to the advantage of the economies, the cultures 
and the wellbeing of rich countries, especially when the trips agreement was 
signed in 1995. There clearly exist huge inequalities between various areas of 
the world as for the patents’ holders and the distribution of royalties’ income of 
patents. The OECD countries (amounting to 14per cent of the world population) 
concentrated 86per cent of the patent applications filed in 1998; it is also worth 
noticing that respectively 54per cent and twelve per cent of the worldwide 
royalty and license fees in 1999 originated from the US and from Japan (United 
Nation development Program (UNDP), 2001). Actually, in 1995, the developed 
countries’ citizens and corporations held 95per cent of the patents in Africa, 
almost 85per cent of those in Latin America and 70per cent in Asia (Agrawal, 
2002; Deere-Birkbeck, 2010). 
 This situation has not substantially changed in recent years. In 2005, despite the 
growth of their R&D capacity, developing countries paid net US$ 17 billion in 
royalties and licensing fees, mostly to IP right holders located in developed 
countries and ten of these latter still controlled over 90per cent of the 
technological output (Deere, 2009).  
The WTO’s Trips agreement establishes minimum standards of IP rights 
protection in the area of patents, copyrights, trademarks, geographic indications, 
industrial designs and integrated circuits layout design. The aim of this article is 
to analyse the double standards approach between WTO Members regarding IP 
rights protection and to demonstrate the misuse of the Trips agreement as a tool 
of discrimination against developed countries and Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) by forcing them to accept IP rights standards which are irrelevant with 
their development needs. 
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2. ASYMMETRY OF BARGAINING POWER BETWEEN 
DEVELOPPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
2.1 THE TOO “VISIBLE HAND” OF U.S. BIG BUSINESS LOBBIES 
Since the Eighties a sharp increase in the capitalist merger movement among US 
multinational corporations in biotechnology sector, in particular in the field of 
food processing and pharmaceutical industries, has been clearly displayed. The 
noticeable impact was the control of the global market by a small number of 
corporations, mainly American, and the reinforcement of their economic private 
power (Sell, 2003).  
This statement of fact explains the reason why at the same time, in particular 
since 1985, the IP rights legal standards have undergone a spectacular 
transformation in the US following American big business’s initiative which 
succeeded to make a common cause with the American administration. As a 
consequence IP was incorporated in the Uruguay multilateral negotiation Round 
whose final act announced the birth of the WTO in Marrakech in April 1994. 
Right before the Uruguay’s Round, this new commercial approach to the IP 
integrated in the GATT-WTO system was strongly supported in the US. The 
Trips agreement’s first draft was written by a coalition of thirteen American 
multinational corporations coming from several sectors (in particular 
biotechnology, pharmaceutical, seed, chemistry, data processing) gathered in an 
ad hoc committee called the ‘Intellectual Property Committee (IPC)’ which, 
among others, coordinated the position of its US members with that of the US 
government during the negotiations. The major US players were the following: 
Pfizer, Merk, Monsanto, Dupont, Bristol-Mayer, FMC Corporation, General 
Electric, General Motors, IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Johnson & Johnson, 
International Rockwell and Warner Communications. 
 In addition to the IPC other coalitions such as the ‘Advisory for Trade 
Negotiations (ACTN)’ and ‘Business Software Alliance (BSA)’, have had a 
considerable impact on US policy advocating the incorporation of IP rights into 
the WTO framework (Drahos and Braithwaite, 2000; Sell 2003; Matthews, 
2002;  Drahos and Braithwaite, 2004, Drahos, 2002a). Thereafter this American 
coalition has been supported by European and Japanese companies through 
methodical national networks and transborder trade associations, in particular 
the Chambers of commerce supported by some economists and legal scholars 
advocating the advantages of stronger IP protection even for developing 
countries. Within the framework of the negotiations, the representatives of these 
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industrial lobbies exerted pressures on their respective government towards the 
integration of IP in the multilateral trade negotiation (Drahos, 2002b;  Deer-
Birkbeck, 2010 ). 
During the negotiations, the US, supported by the European Union (EU) and 
Japan, campaigned strongly to force all WTO members to align their national 
legislations on minimal protection of IP rights’ standards closely modeled on 
their own legal concept and in favor of their corporations’ interests. After long 
and complex discussions, the current provisions of the Trips agreement related 
to patent were the result of a compromise between the US and European 
countries. (Watal, 2001). The main objective was to set up an intellectual 
property rights order, which would effectively maintain and consolidate the 
existing monopolistic privileges of the US big business (McKinley; 2007; Sell 
2003).  
Because of the inequality of bargaining power and disparity in economic 
resources, income and influence between States, the WTO has forced the 
developing countries to comply with the IP rights standards enacted by the US 
and the EU. Several reasons underlie the weakness of some States in terms of 
bargaining despite their numerical superiority: the state’s market power, the 
capacity of a state to enroll other actors in a coalition, the commercial 
intelligence networks, including state’s trade bureaucracy and business 
organization (Drahos, 2003).   
The Option of World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) as an 
organization naturally dealing with IP was forsaken as a result of the dominating 
number of developing countries’ position. Actually the process of negotiation in 
WIPO has always been based on the principle ‘one State, One vote’. For this 
reason, the framework of the WTO multilateral trade negotiations made it 
possible to call IP issues ‘trade related’ and facilitated the signature by 
developing countries of the proposals and drafts submitted by the US, the EU, 
Japan and Canada thanks to the common decision-making process by consensus, 
and in particular the so called ‘green rooms’ negotiating system (Adede, 2001; 
Drahos, 2002a, Drahos, 2002b). According to this system, a ‘five plus five’ 
group submitted a draft to a larger group (‘ten plus ten’) as an agreed package 
reflecting a consensus. The latter group put forward the agreed proposal as a 
consensus to a largest one and thereafter the proposal was transferred to the 
Ministerial Committee for formal endorsement. This system has been criticized 
by developing countries which could not actually take part in the negotiation 
(Adede, 2001; Drahos, 2002a, Drahos, 2002b, Matthews 2002).  Another reason 
for bringing IP issues into WTO originated from the strong WTO’s dispute 
settlement and the trade sanctions mechanism.  
The outcome of these negotiations has tremendously undermined the hope that 
the international trade mechanism established by WTO would ascertain the 
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criteria of good governance. As Drahos pointed out, ‘The TRIPS process 
became one of the hierarchical rather democratic management. (…) The claim 
that the TRIPS negotiations were a model of transparency is difficult to defend. 
In truth, it was the transparency of a one-way mirror’ (Drahos, 2002a, 772).  
 
2.2 UNILATERAL SANCTIONS SUCCESFULLY BREAKED DOWN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ RESISTANCE  
At the beginning of the eighties a vast majority of developing countries were 
opposed to the US attempts to introduce IP rights into the Uruguay multilateral 
negotiations Round and shared the view that WIPO was a more appropriate 
forum to deal with this topic. They feared a restricted access to technology, a 
rise of products and drugs prices on their markets, and the loss of control of their 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge which are not recognised nor fully 
protected by western IP rights legal standards. They viewed the GATT-WTO IP 
negotiations as an attempt by developed countries to maintain a protectionist 
policy in order to strengthen their dominant position on the world market. 
Considering that patents are in a large amount owned worldwide by major 
corporations originating from developed countries, developing countries argued 
that offering the monopoly of IP rights in their markets necessarily favored 
economic interests of these foreign corporations over national interests (Watal, 
2001; Drahos, 2002; Deer-Birkbeck, 2010).   
Nevertheless, this resistance was broken down following the threat put forward 
by the US of unilateral commercial sanctions towards countries which would not 
follow the US trade policy. Indeed the US threatened to refer to the famous 
Section 301 of the 1979 US Trade Agreement Act which limits or prohibits 
access to the US market of products from developing countries, in particular 
those having what US considered to offer an ‘insufficient protection’ of IP 
rights. Developing countries were thus forced to submit to the Trips provisions 
in order to facilitate the access to American market for their textiles and 
agricultural products (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000; Adede, 2001; Matthews, 
2002).   
Some developing countries supported the Trips agreement in the hope that the 
US would be satisfied with the levels of protection they provide and would put 
an end to their unilateral pressure to establish higher levels of IP rights 
protection. Nevertheless, this hope has clearly proved ill-founded (Correa, 2000; 
Watal, 2001), what the ‘Trips-Plus’ bilateral agreements involving the US and 
the EU with developing countries, obviously illustrates, as these provisions 
dramatically increase the minimum standards far beyond the Trips agreement’s. 
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At the final step of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the developing countries 
eventually approved the Trips agreement under the condition of its review in 
1999 in order to better take into account their expectations. Except some relative 
progress made by the Declaration on Trips agreement and Public Health coming 
out of the Doha Ministerial declaration in 2001, this process of reexamination is 
not achieved yet, because of the lack of consensus, in particular as  regard the 
revision of provision 27 and biodiversity protection.  
 
2.3 WEAKNESS COMPETITION RULES AND EXPANDED IP RIGHTS 
PROTECTION 
From the perspective of the WTO free trade model, an international agreement 
on IP rights without effective competition rules seems in itself a paradoxical and 
really problematic issue. There lies an obvious unbalance between the too weak 
antitrust rules and the hard IP rights protection. It is fundamental to be aware 
that Trips provisions related to competition rules such as articles 8.2, 40 and 31 
are truly ineffective in international relations and unable to fight 
anticompetitive practices and abuse of power market committed in developing 
countries by multinational corporations’ holders of IP rights (Abdelgawad, 
2008). 
Furthermore, since the Havana charter of 1948 until nowadays, because of the 
reluctance of US big business, the US administration has on the one hand always 
opposed the establishment within the WTO legal system of any binding 
multilateral agreement aimed at regulating competition in global markets and at 
prohibiting anti-competitive practices of multinational corporations. On the 
other hand, it has actively supported the development of soft competitive rules 
in other international arena, in particular at the International Competition 
Network (ICN). Consequently, Trips did not really pursue the goal of free 
market but, quite the opposite, meant to protect and consolidate exclusive rights 
of IP rights-holders, mainly those from developed countries, and at the same 
time to transfer rents from poor countries (users) to the rich ones (producers) 
(World Bank, 2002; Srinivasan, 2002). 
 
3. LESSONS FROM THE HISTORY: DO AS I TELL BUT NOT AS I DO  
The history of IP rights protection highlights the fact that developed countries 
have exploited the free access to information and the lack of compulsory 
international IP standards to realize technology transfer which enable them to 
achieve economic development. During the early time of their industrial 
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development, many of them had no or weak patent protection and tolerated 
many infringements on IP rights of others countries by nationals. They 
simultaneously achieved their economic supremacy through protectionist 
policies of high tariff, extensive subsidies and preaching free trade towards poor 
countries in order to capture large shares of the former’s markets and to avoid 
the emergence of possible competitors (Chang, 2008). It is only after reaching a 
sufficient economic and technologic level in some vital sectors that they foresaw 
the opportunity of strengthening their patent laws and of opening their market to 
foreign products.  
Economic scholars have observed that for many developed countries and for 
LDCs, global welfare would be lower if these countries were forced to adopt 
developed countries’ standards than if they were allowed to have their own 
standards or even if no protection of IP rights was guaranteed at all (Lai and 
Qiu, 2003). Thus Trips agreement does actually not preserve the best social 
welfare interest to poor countries ( Richards, 2004).  
Until the end of the nineteenth century, IP protection was strictly relevant to the 
national area of each industrial country (Sell, 2003). Nowadays most developed 
countries enacted their patent laws between 1790 and 1850, followed by 
copyright and trade mark laws.  
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, each western country established 
and advocated IP laws of their own design and introduced the protection of the 
inventor only when thinking it was appropriate to do so. For example, fearing 
the might of the German chemical industry, the UK reformed its patent law in 
1919 to prevent the patentability of chemical compounds (Drahos, 2002a).  
The adoption of an IP international regime through the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property in 1883 and the Bern Convention in 1886 on 
copyrights did not reverse this situation. Contrary to the Trips agreement, these 
two conventions have not established uniform or new substantive rules nor 
provided high standards of IP rights protection; but they have offered to the 
parties a large margin of appreciation at the national level on the extent and the 
duration of the protection. ‘The old system recognised inherent variations in the 
development levels of different countries’ (Sell, 2003, p.12). 
Even after the enactment of such a flexible international regime of IP, many 
industrial countries went on infringing the IP rights of foreign holders, and on 
opposing these international rules.  
The US, the strongest advocate of the Trips agreement, waited until 1891 to 
acknowledge copyrights to foreigners and refused in 1886 to sign the Bern 
Convention sharing the opinion, as a developing country at this time, that it had 
the right to access to the heritage of mankind and that it benefited from the 
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freedom to copy in order to educate the new nation and to satisfy their citizens’ 
socio-economic needs (Chang 2001; Chang 2008).  
In the field of patents, the US had the reputation during this period of time to be 
the European patents piracy land.  The US Office of Technology Assessment 
had pointed out that : ‘[w]hen the United States was still a relatively young and 
developing country, for example, it refused to respect international intellectual 
property rights on the grounds that it was freely entitled to foreign works to 
further its social and economic development’, (U.S.Congress,  Office of 
Technology Assessment, 1986, p. 228).  
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, British authors and publishers 
complained against widespread counterfeit of British books in others countries, 
among which were the US where the reprinting of works of famous English 
writers like Charles Dickens had become a common practice (Sell, 2003). 
Having the same strategy, many European countries (Germany, France, 
Switzerland and Russia) deepened their industrial sector by counterfeiting the 
inventions of other Europeans countries, in particular the UK which was 
pioneering the industrial revolution.  
Switzerland did not provide any protection against IP until 1888, and the Swiss 
patent law remained weak until Germany threatened it with commercial 
sanctions in 1907 in retaliation to the Swiss use of its pharmaceutical inventions. 
This law did not cover Chemical substances until 1978 (United Nation 
Development Program (UNDP), 2001; Chang, 2001; Baudenbacher, 2012). 
German industrial representatives ‘had called Switzerland a ‘pirate state’, the 
lack of patent protection a ‘parasitic system’ and accused the Swiss chemical 
industry of behaving like ‘robber barons’’ (Baudenbacher, 2012, p.476).  
Despite the Paris and Bern Conventions, at the end of 19
th
 century, German 
manufacturers discovered several ways of infringing on British trade law in 
1887, sticking the stamp of the country of origin on the packaging instead of 
individual articles so that the final consumer purchasing of an individual product 
ignored the country of origin (in particular for watches), or sending some 
products dismounted into pieces and assembled thereafter in England (Chang, 
2001).  
In the field of pharmaceutical products, many European countries enacted patent 
laws after they had reached a certain level of technical skill in order to preserve 
public health requirements and protect the emerging national pharmaceutical 
sector. France, Germany and Switzerland respectively enacted pharmaceutical 
patent legislation in 1960, 1968 and 1977. (Pugatch, 2004; Juma 1999). At the 
end of the 19th century many European firms established themselves in Basel in 
order to be allowed to imitate German products and this flourishing industry was 
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the basis of the current famous Swiss pharmaceutical industry (Baudenbacher, 
2012).  
 
After their independence, many developing countries tried to change their IP 
laws inherited from colonization in order to suit their national interest, as 
developed countries did in the past (Drahos, 2002a; Deere-Birkbeck, 2010), but 
this willingness was hindered by the Trips agreement. By establishing the 
strictest IP minimum standards in the multilateral arena, the Trips agreement has 
deprived many developing countries from enjoying the same flexibility and 
benefits in modern times. Those standards have limited the option of developing 
countries who attempted to fulfill them while at the same time striving for 
economic development (Karayanidi, 2011). 
 Before the Trips agreement entered into force, most advanced developing 
countries, such as South Korea, Taiwan, China, Brazil and India had achieved a 
prompt economic growth and development with weak IP policies. For these 
countries, as it was the case for developed countries in the past, ‘the 
strengthening of IP rights occurred after the initial stages of increased growth 
and development’  (Bryan Mercurio, 2011, p.49). The attitude of the U.S. and of 
many European countries in the 19
th
 century in IP protection area was very 
similar to policies currently promoted by countries like China, India, Taiwan, 
and South Korea. 
In this connection, the UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights observed 
that: 
‘In fact we consider that developed countries should pay more attention to 
reconciling their own perceived commercial self-interest, with their own interest 
in the reduction of poverty in developing countries. To achieve that end, so far 
as possible developing countries should not be deprived of the flexibility to 
design their IP systems that developed countries enjoyed in earlier stages of their 
own development, and higher IP standards should not be pressed on them 
without a serious and objective assessment of their development impact’ (UK 
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 2002, p.10).  
From this historical overview, five lessons which contrast with the Trips 
fundamental objective of harmonisation in minima can be highlighted: i) each 
industrialized country adapted its own legal system of protection of IP according 
to its national interests and to its development level ii) the technology transfer 
between industrialized countries did not always rest on a legislation devoting a 
rigorous protection of IP rights (United Nation Development Program, 2001) iii) 
The advocacy of the US and of many developed countries for the Trips 
agreement lies in contradiction with their own historical practice when 
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demanding developing countries to abide by legal standards they themselves had 
refused in the past at a time when they had a similar level of development or 
were even more developed iv) The promotion for one universal set of minimum 
uniform standards for all countries has revealed inappropriate and prejudicial, 
what an increasing number of scholars have observed through an economic 
approach (Lai and Qiu, 2003; Chang, 2001, Chang, 2008, Richards, 2004) and 
an historical perspective (AOKI, 1998; Oddi, 1996; Braithwaite and Drahos, 
2000; Drahos, 2002a; Watal 2001; Sell, 2003; Lieshout, Went and Kremer,  
2010; Karayanidi, 2011). v) The Trips agreement, contrary to many WTO 
agreements, did not acknowledge the principle of a special and differential 
treatment in favor of the developing countries following the hostility of 
developed countries. It did not graduate the obligations of WTO members 
according to their development level and to their socio-economic environment. 
Nevertheless it has established a mere transitional period respectively offering 
developing countries and LDCs, the opportunity to delay its implementation for 
five years from 1995 (i.e. until 2000) and ten years (extended until 2013 by 
Trips Council decision). It has also recognised duties to developed countries to 
create incentives for technology transfer to LDCs (article 66.2) and to provide 
technical and financial assistance in favor of developing countries and LDCs 
(article 67) (WTO, 2013). 
 Many of developing countries ‘viewed the extended deadlines as arbitrary and 
insufficient concessions in the face of the Agreement’s deeply unbalanced rules’ 
(Deere, 2009, p.13).  Unlike developed countries, for most developing countries, 
implementing the Trips agreement forced them to raise their IP standards and to 
assume a high economic cost in connection with the legal, judicial and 
administrative reforms required to set up a system of intellectual property in 
accordance with these new standards.  (Deere, 2009; Lieshout, Went and 
Kremer, 2010). The World Bank estimates at 45 billion a year the increase in 
technology license payments for these countries as a result of the Trips 
agreement (cited by Lieshout, Went and Kremer, 2010, p. 84). Consequently the 
Trips requirements have considerably increased the cost of access to technology 
and to new inventions for developing countries for the benefit of foreign 
corporation holders of IP rights.  
As AOKI mentioned : ‘In agreement such as the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (…) there are serious questions as to what nations, 
regions, and classes of persons benefit from “free trade” whether it be scientific 
textbooks, bestsellers, bytes, germ plasm, or CDs’ (AOKI, 1998, p.15) 
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4. ARTICLE 27 of TRIPS AGREEMENT AND BIOPIRACY: Protecting 
inventions from rich countries rather than those from poor ones 
 
Biopiracy may be defined as the misappropriation of developing countries’ 
biological diversity and traditional knowledge (TK) by corporations and 
research institutions from developed countries. The misappropriation by 
bioprospectors of indigenous communities’ TK enables them to locate and 
understand the medical and agricultural use of indigenous plants and varieties 
seeds. As a consequence they plunder and transfer these resources and 
knowledge in order to obtain, in many northern countries, after some minor 
genetic alteration, a protection by patents (or rights of vegetable obtaining) of 
their alleged “invention” (or of plant varieties). Proceeding this way, seeds and 
pharmaceutical companies tremendously reduce their investment cost by 
rubbing traditional inventions, which were already discovered, developed and 
tested by indigenous communities but not protected by the western and 
international IP rights system like the Trips agreement.  
 
Biopiracy has largely expanded in the international arena and harmed millions 
of indigenous people; it has brought about for these people and their developing 
countries a loss of earning calculated in billions of dollars. According to studies 
carried out by the UNDP in 1999, even if only two per cent of royalty were 
charged on genetic resources and TK that had been developed by local 
communities in poor countries, it is estimated that the developed countries and 
their corporations would owe nearly 5.3 billion US dollars per annum in unpaid 
royalties for medical plants and farmers crop seeds (The United Nations 
Development Programme, 1999). Throughout the last decades, famous biopiracy 
cases concerned developed country’s disputed patents granted for plants and TK 
from developing countries: Curcuma, Neem, Ayahuasca, Hoodia; Mexican 
Yellow Enola Beans, (Shiva, 1997; Mgbeoji,  2006,  Robinson, 2010;  
Abdelgawad, 2007). More recently, Bt Brinjal case highlights the unauthorized 
access and uses of Indian biological material and TK by the US multinational 
seed corporation Monsanto and its Indian collaborators in violation of Indian 
Biodiversity Act (Abdelgawad, 2012). In practice, biopiracy acts were 
committed in most cases by US business actors and sometimes by European or 
Japanese ones.  
 
Article 27 of the Trips agreement relating to patent is a prominent illustration of 
double standards in IP rights protection at the international level, in particular 
with regard to both aspects ; i) firstly it protects modern inventions from piracy 
and ignores at the same time the misappropriation of TK, biopiracy, ii) secondly, 
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it only recognises western IP rights concepts and does not mention customary 
and collective IP rights developed by indigenous communities since centuries.  
 
According to article 27.1 ‘patent shall be available for any inventions (…), 
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable to 
industrial application’. This article protects only “modern” technology inherited 
from the industrial revolution in western countries, as the three criteria of 
patentability clearly show it. It embraces a Western approach of intellectual 
property. This provision preserves the interests of innovators in the capitalist 
system but does not protect the indigenous and local communities which supply 
the underlying genetic material and traditional knowledge. The protection of IP 
rights is viewed in this article from a sole mercantile view and from the private 
and exclusive rights of the patent holder.  
This framework is in sharp contrast with the collective and intergenerational 
nature of TK and with the indigenous spiritual vision of the world: interests of 
the community, share of biological and immaterial resources, belief in the sacred 
character of the nature which cannot be appropriated nor exploited. The 
intellectual property rights are recognised only, according to article 27.1, when 
knowledge and innovation generate economic profits, and not in the case for 
TK, when the first priority is aimed at fulfilling social needs such as medical 
treatment and food security for the poor. Because of this narrow and unilateral 
definition of knowledge and innovation, the Trips agreement can be criticized 
for supporting Multinationals Corporation’s interests and for excluding TK and 
biodiversity from protection (Shiva, 1997; Mgbeoji (2006); Abdelgawad 2007). 
The universality given to western IP rights’ approach by the TRIPS agreement 
set up a selective process which determines what kind of innovation must be 
protected and who have the right to control biological resources and related TK 
in global markets.  
Moreover, article 27 failed to recognise the customary and collective IP rights 
system developed by the indigenous communities since centuries to protect and 
safeguarded their TK.  
 As G. Dutfield pointed out : ‘TK holders and communities are understandably 
concerned that one type of IPR system is being universalised and prioritised to 
the exclusion of all others, including their counterpart customary systems. This 
does not seem fair. After all, if indigenous peoples in WTO member states are 
required to accept the existence of patents that they are economically prevented 
from availing themselves of (…), why should their own knowledge-related 
customary regimes including property rules not be respected by others?’ 
(Dutfield, 2006, p.24).  
 
According to the Trips agreement, the protection of intellectual property rights 
in the categories recognised in western legal cultures has become a mandatory 
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requirement for developing countries within the multilateral trading system 
(Gana, 1995).  
 
Article 27.3(b) most certainly sets up a room of manoeuvre to every WTO 
Member to legally provide with the protection of its own plants varieties “either 
by patent or by an effective suis generis system or by any combination thereof”; 
this flexibility must be used by developed countries at the national level. 
Nevertheless, this article does not offer any binding multilateral system for 
WTO members in order to protect TK. Article 27: 3 b) ignores the fundamental 
role and contribution of the local populations in the development and 
safeguarding of the living resources. Due to the transnational character of 
biopiracy acts, national rules cannot have a sufficient deterrent effect to fight 
effectively against the plunder of TK by multinational corporations. In addition, 
this article demands all WTO Members to recognise patent on alive being mico-
organisms and on natural microbiological processes. The first priority of this 
provision is to protect foreign patents’ holders, in particular biotechnology 
corporations and not indigenous people who, under spiritual and ethical 
believes, oppose patents on life-forms which should be unconditionally 
prohibited according to their customary IP rules. 
Consequently, the Trips agreement creates a favorable legal framework to 
biopiracy development in the international arena. On the one hand, it strongly 
fights against piracy of modern inventions by setting up a binding multilateral 
system that requires from WTO members to implement minimum standards of 
IP rights, to enforce IP rights under their laws and ascertains at the same time 
deterrent legal sanctions through the WTO’s dispute settlement system. On the 
other hand, article 27 obliges developing countries, rich in biodiversity, to 
recognise the patentability of some categories of biological resources without 
establishing any multilateral system for their protection against 
misappropriation. Indeed only inventions from rich countries and not those from 
poor ones are actually protected.  
Contrary to the Trips agreement, article 8 of the Convention of Biological 
Diversity (CBD) has recognised the fundamental contribution of TK, and 
innovations by indigenous and local communities for the conservation and the 
sustainable use of biological diversity.  The Trips agreement failed to share the 
CBD’s goals of informed consent and benefit sharing. The criteria for 
patentability provided by article 27 made no mention to CBD requirements. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
This article has shown that the Trips agreement high minimum levels of 
intellectual property protection as a result of developed countries’ negotiation 
power are based in reality on a double standards approach. Developed countries 
have imposed on developing ones and LDSc the enforcement of IP rights 
protection levels that they would have not themselves followed in the earlier 
stage of their development. Moreover, the Trips agreement supports unfair and 
selective “IP Rights” and “invention” concepts in favor of western IP rights 
system to the detriment of TK. This situation contributed to strongly fighting 
against piracy of modern inventions in global markets and to permitting or not 
condemning biopiracy. A fundamental revision of the Trips’ approach has to be 
carried out in order to recognise TK and indigenous communities’ customary IP 
rights systems. This would merely be a first step towards repairing the historical 
injustice committed by developed countries’ multinationals corporations on 
these communities. 
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